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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE AT THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM:
"BRISTL[ING] WITH HOSTILITY TO ALL THINGS
RELIGIOUS"* OR NECESSARY SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE?
Charles J. Russo** and Ralph D. Mawdsley ***

I. INTRODUCTION

In its first two cases of the new Millennium involving the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United
1
States Constitution, the Supreme Court continued to reveal
the deep ideological polarization of its members on the place of
religion in education, whether dealing with prayer at public
school activities or aid to religiously affiliated nonpublic
schools. In the first of the two disputes, a closely divided CourtQ
in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (Santa Fe),
* In his strident dissent in Santa Fe Independent School District u. Doe, 120 S.
Ct. 2266, 2283 (2000), wherein the Court struck down student sponsored and led
prayer prior to the start of a high school football game, Chief Justice Rehnquist railed
that the majority opinion" ... bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life."
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
** Charles J. Russo, Professor, Department of Educational Leadership, Adjunct
Professor, School of Law, and Fellow, Center for International Programs, University of
Dayton. B.A. 1972, St. John's University; M. Div. 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate
Conception; J.D. 1983, St. John's University; Ed.D. 1989, St. John's University. charles.russo@notes. udayton.edu.
*** Ralph D. Mawdsley, Professor of Educational Administration, Cleveland
State University, Cleveland, Ohio. J.D., University of Illinois; Ph.D., University of
Minnesota. 2001 President, Education Law Association. Dr. Mawdsley has written extensively on religious liberty issues and is the author of over 260 publications, including twelve books. At Cleveland State University, Dr. Mawdsley teaches courses in
School Law, Sports Law, and Special Education Law. He has served as an assistant
county prosecutor and an in-house legal counsel for a university. He is licensed to practice law in Illinois and Minnesota.
1. In its relevant section, the First Amendment reads that, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;"
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. 2266.

231

232

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2001

ruled that a school board policy permitting student led prayers
prior to the start of high school football games violated the Establishment Clause. Nine days later, in Mitchell u. Helms
3
(Helms), with the majority and dissent essentially changing
sides, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that permits states to loan educational materials and
equipment to public and religiously affiliated nonpublic
schools.
Whether the Supreme Court is, in the words of Chief Jus4
tice Rehnquist, "hostil[e] to all things religious" thereby attempting to deprive religion of an opportunity to participate in
the public marketplace of ideas, or merely maintaining a necessary separation of Church and State, certainly depends on
one's perspective. Regardless of how one interprets the Court's
most recent decisions, it is clear that the juxtaposition of judicial analyses in Santa Fe and Helms are worth considering not
only because of their impact on education but also for what
they mean with regard to the Court's wider First Amendment
jurisprudence. As such, the remainder of this article is divided
into three sections. The first section sets the stage by briefly
reviewing key Supreme Court cases on governmental aid toreligiously affiliated nonpublic schools and prayer in public
schools. The next section briefly reviews the opinions in Santa
Fe and Helms. The final section of the article examines the
meaning of Santa Fe and Helms for the future of the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. More specifically,
this section of the article focuses on whether the Court has displayed hostility toward religion and what test it is likely to apply in subsequent litigation. The article closes with a reflection
on what potential changes in the Court's membership over the
next few years might mean for the future of First Amendment
jurisprudence.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURT'S FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE

The well documented history of the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence on both state aid to religiously affiliated

3. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
4. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. 2266.
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nonpublic elementary and secondary schools and prayer in a
variety of school settings follows anything but a linear progression. In other words, although the Court's first case on the mer7
its of the Establishment Clause, Everson v. Board of Education,8 involved aid, because subsequent litigation also
9
addressed religious activity in the schools, it did not address
another case involving aid to nonpublic schools under the Child
10
Benefit test for twenty-one more years. Throughout what
might be described as the development of the first generation of
the Court's modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Court apparently found it unnecessary to develop a measure

5. In addition to works cited herein, for recent articles on point, see, e.g., Carl H.
Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETJ!!CS & PUB. POL'Y 285 (1999); Eugene Volokh,
Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341
(1999); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers are Unconstitutional and Why They're Not, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397 (1999); Arval A. Morris, Public Educational Services in Religious Schools: An Opening Wedge for Vouchers? 122 EDUC. L.
REP. 545 (1998).
6. In addition to works cited herein, for recent articles on point, see, e.g., Ralph
D. Mawdsley, Student Choice and Graduation Prayer: Division Among the Circuits, 129
EDUC. L. REP. 553 (1998); Lisa C. Shaw, Student-Initiated Religious Speech, the Classroom, and the First Amendment: Why the Supreme Court Should Have Granted Review
in Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 18 PACE L. REV. 255 (1998); Daniel N.
McPherson, Student-Initiated Religious Expression in the Public Schools: The Need for
a Wider Opening in the School House Gate, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 393 (1997); Myron
Schreck, Balancing the Right to Pray at Graduation and the Responsibility of Disestablishment, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1869 (1995).
7. Prior to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court addressed three cases involving non public schools but resolved them under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Establishment Clause.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state statute prohibiting the
teaching of foreign language to students who had not completed eighth grade); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a compulsory attendance statute
from Oregon that have required parents of students in nonpublic schools to send them
to public schools); Cochran v. State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (upholding a Louisiana statute that provided textbooks for students regardless of whether they attended
public or non public schools).
8. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333
U.S. 203 (1948) (striking down a board's practice of permitting religious leaders to
come into public schools during the class day to provide religious instruction as violative of the Establishment Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding
the constitutionality of a released time program that permitted children to leave school
early to attend religious classes in religious schools on the basis that it accommodated
the wishes of their parents); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), see discussion at note
41 infra and accompanying text.
10. See discussion of Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), infra at
note 21 and accompanying text.
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for cases in this arena.
1
However, in 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman/ the Court enunciated the seemingly ubiquitous tripartite test, employed in virtually all subsequent cases involving religion, as a single standard of review for Establishment Clause cases. The Court
asked: (1) whether governmental aid has a secular legislative
purpose, (2) whether it has a principle or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) whether that effect creates excessive government entanglement. The Court's
long time reliance on Lemon notwithstanding, questions can be
raised about the propriety of this tripartite test, which was
crafted from earlier cases on prayer and Bible reading in
school. The Court also considered the constitutionality of a
state real property tax exemption for church-owned property,
making the Lemon test a kind of "one-size-fits-all" measure for
the different kinds of issues that the Establishment Clause
presents. Yet, as the Court struggles to define an appropriate
test under which to review interactions between religion and
the government, whether with regard to state aid to religiously
affiliated nonpublic schools or prayer in public school settings,
and despite varying degrees of dissatisfaction among the Justices, the Court continues to rely on Lemon or variations on its
well-worn theme. Insofar as the Court's Establishment Clause
12
jurisprudence has been so well documented, the remainder of
this section highlights the major cases that have shaped the
limits of the Court's thinking in K-12 educational settings
rather than providing an encyclopedic overview in this evergrowing area.
A. The Supreme Court and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated
Nonpublic Schools

Over the past fifty-three years, the Supreme Court has
permitted governmental aid on the basis that it helps the indi-

11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
12. Even as the Court debates its future, the Lemon test continues to generate
grist for the academic mill. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should it be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected? 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ET!IICS & PUB. Por,'y 513 (1990);
Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 72 EDUC. L. REP. 1
(1992); MichaelS. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993); Daniel
0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993); Thomas C. Marks, Jr. &
Michael Bertolini, Lemon Is a Lemon: Toward a Rational Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1997).
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vidual children and not their schools. Beginning with Everson
in 194 7, the Court has developed the Child Benefit test, under
13
which aid, in the forms of transportation, text books, 14 and
15
now, in Helms, instructional materials, including computers,
is available to students who attend religiously affiliated nonpublic schools. Even so, over its lifetime, the Child Benefit test
has had a curious history. It was applied with some favor until
1968, was essentially stagnant between 1971 and 1985, and
was revitalized in 1993 by a slim majority of the Court.

1. The Genesis of the Child Benefit Test
In Everson, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state
statute from New Jersey that reimbursed parents for the cost
of transportation for sending their children to nonpublic
schools. The Court reasoned that since transportation was paid
for by the tax dollars of all parents, regardless of where their
children attended school, and because the aid primarily benefited the students, rather than the schools they attended, the
statute was constitutional.
As an example of how the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence failed to develop in a linear fashion in which there
16
was a logical progression of issues, the next major dispute to
shape the Court's development of a test under which to evaluate the propriety of any relationships between religion and
government arose in the companion cases of School District of
11
Abington Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curtlett. In
these cases the Court addressed the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania statute and Maryland rule adopted pursuant to
state laws that required Bible reading and/or the recitation of
the Lord's prayer at the beginning of the class day in public
schools. In both cases the state was not directly involved in the
13. See Everson, 330 U.S. 1; but see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (striking down, inter alia, the use of public school buses to take children from religious
schools on field trips for fear of violating the Lemon test).
14. See Allen, 392 U.S. 236; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolman,
433 U.S. 229, (upholding state statutes under which textbooks for secular subjects were
loaned to students in non public schools).
15. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
16. Of course, in the interim, the Court ruled in Illinois ex rel. McCollum u. Board
of Education of School District No. 71, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach u. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952); and Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See supra note 10 and text accompanying note 41 for further explanation.
17. 374 u.s. 203 (1963).
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composition of the prayers, children participated voluntarily,
students could be excused from taking part in the religious activities upon the written request of their parents or guardians,
and no single Christian religion was favored.
Schempp introduced a new era in the relationship between
religion and government. The Court enunciated a two-part test
to invalidate both practices even though neither state was directly involved in the composition of the prayers, students participated voluntarily, and no single religion was favored. In
creating a measure under which to evaluate the constitutionality of prayer, the Court maintained that "[t]he test may be
stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect
of the [legislative] enactment? ... [T]o withstand the strictures
of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
18
religion." Perhaps in an attempt to allay concerns that it was
anti-religious, the Court hastened to add that nothing in its rationale excluded the secular study of the Bible in public schools
19
in an appropriate context such as literature or history.
The so-called "purpose and effects" test took on added significance later in the decade when the Court applied it in a
case involving state aid to religious schools. In Board of Educa20
tion v. Allen, the Court upheld a New York law requiring
school boards to loan textbooks for secular instruction to all
students on the ground that it applied to all children regardless
of whether they attended public or non public schools. In Allen,
the Court relied heavily on the fact that regulations overseeing
the program specified which books on officially approved lists
could be used in the non~ublic schools. Until its recent deci1
22
sions in Agostini v. Felton and Mitchell v. Helms, Allen was
not only the last case wherein the Court expanded the horizons
of the Child Benefit test in a K-12 setting but was also generally accepted as the outer limit of permissible aid to religiously
affiliated nonpublic schools.
18. Id. at 222.
19. "The holding of the Court today plainly does not foreclose teaching about the
Holy Scriptures or about the differences between religious sects in classes in literature
or history. Indeed, whether or not the Bible is involved, it would be impossible to teach
meaningfully many subjects in the social sciences or the humanities without some
mention of religion." Id. at 300.
20. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
21. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
22. 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
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2. The Hibernation of the Child Benefit Test
The next major dispute involving the Establishment Clause
23
and state aid to nonpublic schools was Lemon v. Kurtzman,
wherein the Court invalidated programs from Rhode Island
and Pennsylvania. The case from Rhode Island involved a state
statute that paid salary supplements to certified teachers in
nonpublic schools who taught subjects that were only offered in
public schools. Similarly, the dispute from Pennsylvania focused on a state law that reimbursed nonpublic schools for
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials as
long as they did not contain "any subject matter expressing re24
ligious teaching, or the morals of any sect." In striking down
both programs, the Court added a third element to the "purpose and effects" test. It added excessive entanglement, from
25
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, to create the tripartite test that it has relied on in virtually all cases involving
the Establishment Clause. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
26
Burger declared that:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not las27
ter "an excessive government entanglement with religion."

Even though the first two parts of the seemingly ubiquitous
and increasingly unworkable Lemon test were developed in the
context of prayer cases, the Court continued to apply it widely

23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24. Id. at 610.
25. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). "Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end
the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end re~dt-the effect-is not an
excessive government entanglement with religion."
26. For an interesting discussion of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence of
the Burger Court, see Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.
CHI. 1. REV. 115 (1992).
27. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (internal citations omitted). When addressing entanglement and state aid to religiously affiliated institutions, Chief Justice Burger
noted that the Court took three additional factors into consideration: "we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and
religious authority." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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in generally striking down attempts to expand the boundaries
of permissible state aid to religious schools. For example, in
28
Meek v. Pittenger, a case from Pennsylvania, the Court upheld
textbook loans while striking down provisions that would have
permitted loans of instructional materials such as laboratory
equipment and the on-site delivery of auxiliary services for
students who attended religiously affiliated nonpublic
29
30
schools. Similarly, in Wolman v. Walter, a dispute from
Ohio, the Court upheld textbook loans, reimbursement for
standardized testing, the on-site delivery of diagnostic testing,
and off-site delivery of therapeutic aid. At the same time, the
Court struck down provisions that would have permitted the
loans of instructional materials and the use of public school
buses to take children from religiously affiliated nonpublic
31
schools on field trips. Interestingly, in Mitchell v. Helms, discussed below, the plurality specifically struck down those portions of Meek and Wolman that prohibited the loans of instruc32
tional materials.
The Child Benefit test reached its nadir in the companion
33
cases of School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball and Aguilar
34
v. Felton. In Ball, the Court struck down a Michigan program
designed to provide supplementary classes in classrooms located in and leased from nonpublic schools that were taught by
28. 421 u.s. 349 (1975).
29. See also, e.g., PEARL v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down New
York state statutes that provided direct payments to nonpublic schools to maintain facilities and tuition reimbursement and income tax credits that would have allowed low
income parents to send their children to nonpublic schools); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825 (1973) (striking down a New York state statute under which the state reimbursed
parents for the cost of sending their children to nonpublic schools); Levitt v. PEARL,
413 U.S. 472 (1973) (striking down a New York state statute that reimbursed nonpublic schools for state-mandated educational records where there were insufficient safeguards to ensure that funds were not diverted to religious usages such as testing students on religious matters). But see PEARL v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding
the revised New York state statute in Levitt since sufficient safeguards were set in
place to protect against impermissible use of public funds).
30. 433 u.s. 229 (1977).
31. In a ruling that defied the Court's the current trend, in Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983) the Court upheld Minnesota's state income tax deduction for tuition,
uniforms, and books, regardless of whether children attended public or nonpublic
schools even though more than 90% of the people who benefited from the program had
children in religious schools.
32. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2555 (2000) ("[t]o the extent that Meek
and Wolman conflict with this holding, we overrule them.").
33. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
34. 473 u.s. 402 (1985).
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full-time public school employees and staff from the nonpublic
schools who were hired on a part-time basis. The Court argued
that while the program had a secular legislative purpose, it
was unconstitutional because it violated the Establishment
Clause by having the primary or principal effect of advancing
religion.
In Aguilar, the Court prohibited the on-site delivery of remedial educational services for children who attended religiously affiliated schools in New York City. The aid was provided under the auspices of Title I of the Elementary and
35
Secondary Education Act, a comprehensive program designed
to offer remedial assistance for children who are economically
disadvantaged. Even in the absence of accusations or evidence
of any impropriety, the Court struck it down on the basis that
it might lead to excessive entanglement between religious
schools and the government. In a strident dissent that essentially became her rationale in subsequently striking down
36
Aguilar in Agostini v. Felton, Justice O'Connor argued that
the Court was "throwing the baby out with the bath water"
since the Court's unwarranted concern over fears of excessive
entanglement would mean that so many students would be,
and in fact were, deprived of greatly needed educational ser.

37

VICeS.

3. Revitalization of Child Benefit
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
38
Blind, although decided in the context of higher education,
was a harbinger of future developments. In Witters, the Court
35. 20 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
36. 473 U.S. 373, 421 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
37. Following Aguilar, one researcher estimated that perhaps 30% of eligible
children in non public schools were deprived of services. Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles
J. Russo, Supreme Court Upholds Religious Liberty: Educational Implications, 84
EDUC. L. REP. 877, 893 (1993) at n.141 and accompanying text. Moreover, in Agostini,
the Court noted that following Aguilar, it was estimated that some 20,000 economically
disadvantaged students in New York City and more than 183,000 children nation-wide
experienced a decline in Title I services. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 213
(1997).
38. 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (reh'g denied, Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for
the Blind, 4 75 U.S. 1091 (1986). In fairness, it should be noted that the Supreme Court
of Washington, in Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash.
1989), cert. denied sub nom. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 493
U.S. 850 (1989) subsequently found that language in the state constitution prohibited
the use of public funds for religious instruction.
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decided that a vocational rehabilitation program that provided
financial assistance to a blind student studying for the ministry
at a Bible college did not violate the Establishment Clause. The
Court reasoned that since the student could have relied on the
program in a variety of different institutions if, for example, he
had wished to study to be an accountant, then it was constitutional since he, and not the college, was the primary beneficiary of the aid.
9
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District:~ marked the
beginning of the resurgence of the Child Benefit test in the K12 context. Here, the Court relied on the Child Benefit test and
ruled that it permitted the on-site delivery of the services of a
sign language interpreter for a deaf student as he attended a
Catholic high school in Arizona. The Court found that since the
interpreter was a mere conduit of information, the student was
entitled to receive the services on-site because he, not his
school, was the primary beneficiary of the aid.
40
In Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court took the unusual
step of vitiating an injunction that had been entered after its
earlier decision in Aguilar v. Felton when it essentially reversed its earlier judgment by striking down an injunction that
prohibited New York City from delivering Title I services onsite in religious schools. Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor, in basically offering her dissent in Aguilar as the
Court's holding, reasoned that New York City's implementation
of Title I did not violate the Establishment Clause because
there was no governmental indoctrination, there were no distinctions between recipients based on religion, and there was
no excessive entanglement. As such, the Court held that as a
federally-funded program that provides supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children, Title I's delivery of
services on-site in religiously affiliated schools did not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause because it had appropriate
safeguards in place to prevent the endorsement of religion.

B. The Supreme Court and Prayer in Schools
The Court first addressed the propriety of prayer in a school
setting when, shortly after the New York State Board of Regents offered a prayer for recitation at the start of the day in
39. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
40. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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public schools, parents filed suit arguing that the practice was
contrary to their religious beliefs and those of their children. In
41
Engel v. Vitale, the Court considered the constitutionality of
prayer in schools, holding that the Board violated the First
Amendment even though students could have been excused
from participation. The Court concluded that governmental involvement in creating the prayer was dangerously close to the
official establishment of religion. A year later, in the companion cases of School District of Abington Township v. Schempp
42
and Murray v. Curlett, the Court, as noted earlier, applied the
first two parts of what became the Lemon test. In spite of this
initial flurry of activity on prayer in schools, after Schempp, it
was more than twenty years before the Court returned to the
question as it focused its attention on litigation involving governmental aid to religiously affiliated nonpublic schools.
As state legislatures sought to circumvent the Court's ban
43
44
on school-sponsored prayer and religious activity, laws
mandatinE or permitting moments of silence emerged. Wallace
v. Jaffree was the first such case to make its way to the Supreme Court. Here, an Alabama statute originally providing for
a moment of silent meditation was amended to include voluntary prayer. The Court found it unnecessary to proceed beyond
Lemon's first prong in deciding that the law violated the Establishment Clause because the legislature was motivated solely
by the religious purpose of returning organized prayer to the

41. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
42. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
43. In Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g denied 449 U.S. 1104 (1981),
612 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1981), the Supreme Court struck down, without the benefit of oral
argument, a statute from Kentucky that required the posting of the Ten Commandments on a wall of each public classroom in the Commonwealth on the ground that it
violated the Establishment Clause.
44. The Court has held firm against prayer in the schools but not other arenas.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska legislature's
practice of hiring a religious chaplain to open each legislative day with a prayer). But
see Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,171 F.3d 369 (6"' Cir. 1999), petition for
rehearing en bane denied, 183 F.3d 538 (6"' Cir. 1999) (striking down a prayer initiated
by the board president as violating the Establishment Clause). But see Bacus v. Palo
Verde Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 11 F. Supp.2d 1192 "cc.D. Cal. 1998) (holding
that since prayer at the start of a board meeting was not at a school related function, it
was constitutional). For a discussion of Coles, see Charles J. Russo, Between A Rock
and A Hard Place: The Emerging Question of Prayer at School Board Meetings, 137
EDUC. 1. REP. 423 (1999).
45. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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46

public schools. In accordance with that decision, the Court
struck the law down since it clearly intended to characterize
prayer as a favored practice.
47
In Karcher u. May, the only other case involving a moment
of silence to reach the Supreme Court, the Justices avoided
48
reaching a judgment on the merits. The Court ruled that the
appellants, former leaders of the New Jersey State Assembly
and Senate who lost their leadership positions, lacked standing
to appeal the Third Circuit's decision upholding a ruling that
the statute permitting a moment of silence was unconstitu.
l 49
t wna.
In 1991, the Court finally accepted a case on the merits of
46. If ever there was a smoking gun, State Senator Donald G. Holmes, prime
sponsor of the bill, provided one. He testified that the law "was an 'effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools .. .it is a beginning and a step in the right direction.'
Apart from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, [he] unequivocally
testified that he had 'no other purpose in mind"' when he introduced the bill. !d. at 43.
47. 484 U.S. 72 (1987). For a discussion of this case, see StevenS. Goldberg, The
Supreme Court Remains Silent on Moments of Silence: Karcher v. May, 43 EDUC. L.
REP. 849 (1988).
48. Early in the twentieth century, five courts, in six different cases, had earlier
held that religious activities in the morning did not violate state constitutions. Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263 (1880); Moore v.
Monroe, 20 N.W. 475 (Iowa 1884); Billard v. Board ofEduc. of Topeka, 76 P. 422 (Kan.
1904); Hackett v. Brooksville Graded Sch. Dist., 87 S.W. 792 (Ky. 1905); Knowlton v.
Baumhover, 166 N.W. 202 (Iowa 1918). However, at least five courts, including Illinois,
which had previously decided to the contrary, held that religious exercise violated their
constitutions. See State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890); Freeman
v. Scheve, 91 N.W. 846 (Neb. 1902); People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ. of Dist. 24, 92
N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910); Herold v. Parish Bd. of Sch. Directors, 68 So. 116 (La. 1915); State
ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 226 N.W. 348 (S.D. 1929).
49. In Bown v. Gwinnett County School District, 112 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997), a
teacher in Georgia unsuccessfully challenged a state law that permits a moment of
quiet reflection in public schools. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that the law satisfied
the Lemon test.
More recently, the Fourth Circuit, in an unreported decision, refused to grant an
injunction to the American Civil Liberties Union that would have blocked a Virginia
statute, Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-203 calling for a" ... one-minute period of silence [during
which] the teacher responsible for each classroom shall take care that all pupils remain
silent and make no distracting display to the end that each pupil may, in the exercise
of his or her individual choice, meditate, pray, or engage in any other silent activity
which does not interfere with, distract, or impede other pupils in the like exercise of
individual choice." Philip Walzer, et a!, Minute of Silence Debuts: Schools Start Required Quiet Interval Despite ACLU Objection, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT & THE LEDGER
STAR, Sept. 6, 2000, 2000 WL 23683153. Using Justice Stevens obtuse reasoning in
Santa Fe lndt. Sch. Dist. V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (see infra note 61 and accompanying text), wherein the policy was struck down even before it went into effect, fears of
religion creeping into public education may lead some jurists to strike down otherwise
facially neutral statutes of this type.
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51

graduation prayer5° in Lee v. Weisman. Based on the school
system's policy of inviting religious leaders to pray at graduation ceremonies, administrators in Providence, Rhode Island,
asked a rabbi to offer nonsectarian prayers which followed the
guidelines prepared by the National Conference of Christians
and Jews. After a student and her father unsuccessfully sought
to prevent the rabbi from offering the prayers at her graduation, a federal trial court enjoined the district from permitting
prayer at graduation ceremonies, holding that doing so violated
the effect prong of Lemon by creating a symbolic union between
52
religion and the government. The First Circuit affirmed without finding it necessary to expand on the trial court's analy.

SIS.

53

The Supreme Court, in a five to four opinion written by
Justice Kennedy, affirmed but surprised most observers by vir54
tually ignoring Lemon. Kennedy's opinion focused on two
main points: the relationships between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, and the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses. Justice Scalia issued a scathing dissent wherein
he declared that the Court went "beyond the realm where
judges know what they are doing. The Court's argument that
state officials have 'coerced' students to take part in the invocation and benediction ceremonies is, not to put too fine a point
55
on it, incoherent." In the interim, the circuit courts have been
56
split over the propriety of prayer at graduation ceremonies.

50. For a fuller discussion of prayer at public school graduation ceremonies, see
Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: Exercise in Futility
or a Teachable Moment? BYU EDUC. AND L.J. 1 (Winter 1999). 1-23. See also Ralph D.
Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Lee v. Weisman: The Supreme Court Pronounces the
Benediction on Public School Graduation Prayers, 77 EDUC. L. REP. 1071 (1992).
51. 505 u.s. 577 (1992).
52. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990).
53. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990).
54. 505 U.S. at 577.
55. !d. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, vacated, and remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992); on remand, 977 F.2d 963 (5th
Cir. 1992) (upholding student sponsored prayer at a public high school graduation
ceremony), reh'g denied, 983 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 967 (1993).
See also Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted and judgment vacated with
directions to dismiss as moot, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995) (initially holding that since school
officials ultimately controlled the ceremony, they could not permit students to decide
whether to have public prayer at graduation); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l
Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3"' Cir. 1996) (affirming that a policy of permitting student-
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57

However, it was not until Santa Fe, discussed below, that the
Court decided to address prayer in a narrow setting such as at
58
a high school football game.

led prayer at a public high school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment
Clause, finding that since the board retained significant authority over the ceremony,
prayer could not be upheld as promoting the free speech rights of students); Doe v.
Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 7 F. Supp.2d 1110 (D. Idaho 1997), affd 147 F.3d 832 (9th
Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, opinion withdrawn, 165 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated,
177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (initially upholding a board policy permitting students,
chosen on the basis of neutral secular criteria, to offer uncensored presentations, including prayers, during high school graduation programs since it had a secular purpose, a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and avoided excessive government entanglement with religion); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d
1070 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a board policy permitting students to vote on
whether to have unrestricted student-led messages at the beginning and closing of
graduation ceremonies did not violate the Establishment Clause), opinion vacated,
2000 WL 694156 (Oct. 2, 2000).
57. Earlier, the Eleventh Circuit banned prayer prior to the start of public school
football games. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 490 U.S. 1090 (1989). See also Steele v. Van Buren Pub. Sch. Dist., 845 F.2d
1492 (8th Cir. 1988) (prohibiting a high school band teacher from leading the band in
prayer at mandatory rehearsals and performances); Doe v. Airline Indep. Sch. Dist.,
563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that recitation of an expressly Christian
prayer initiated by the principal or other school employee at athletic contests and pep
rallies violated the Establishment Clause).
58. Lower federal courts have examined the propriety of student-initiated prayer
at a variety of school activities other than graduations. See, e.g., lngbretsen v. Jackson
Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. Ingebretsen,
519 U.S. 965 (1996) (invalidating a law that allowed students to initiate nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing prayer at various compulsory and noncompulsory school events); Doe
v. Duncanville lndep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1993) (prohibiting school employees from initiating and leading students in prayer before and after athletic practices and competitions); Chandler v. James, 958 F. Supp. 1550 (M.D. Ala 1997), affd in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 180 F.3d 1254 (11'" Cir. 1999), request for en bane
rehearing denied, 198 F.3d 265 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a school district's act of
allowing student initiated, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing voluntary prayer as schoolrelated events did not violate the Establishment Clause since it was required under the
Free Speech and Expression Clause of the First Amendment); Herdahl v. Pontotoc
County Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (prohibiting a religious club from
making announcements, including prayers and Bible readings, over a school wide intercom system; however, the court did permit student-initiated prayer before school to
continue); Committee for Voluntary Prayer v. Wimberly, 704 A.2d 1199 (D.C. 1997)
(holding that a proposed initiative on nonsectarian, nonproselytizing, student initiated
prayer at school related activities was not a proper subject within the meaning of voter
initiated measures).
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THE CASES

A. Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe

The Board of Trustees of the Santa Fe Independent School
59
District, near Galveston, Texas, following Lee v. Weisman and
60
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, adopted
policies permitting student volunteers to deliver prayers at
graduations and football games. In April 1995, students and
their parents challenged the prayer policies seeking injunctive
relief and money damages under the theory that the policies
violated the Establishment Clause.
A federal trial court upheld both policies as long as the
prayers were nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. Moreover,
since the Board had fall-back policies in place, adopted in the
event that they were struck down, requiring the prayers to be
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing, the court refused to grant
61
prospective injunctive relief, damages, or attorney fees. Both
parties appealed, the plaintiffs because the policies had not
been found to violate the Establishment Clause and the defendants since the Board had to use its fall-back policies. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed that prayer at graduation had to be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing, reversed and struck down the policy
permitting prayers at football games, affirmed the denial of injunctive relief and damages, and reversed the denial of attarney ' s fees. (}2
1. Supreme Court Majority Decision

Rather than review the broader question of prayer at
graduation ceremonies and resolve the split between the Circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited
question of "[w]hether [the school district's] policy permitting
student-led, student-initiated.prayer at football Jiames violates
6
the Establishment Clause." As anticipated,
a fractured
59. 505 U.S. at 577.
60. On remand following Lee, the Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. Clear Creek Independ·
cnt School District, 977 F.2d at 963, essentially followed Justice Scalia's dissent in Lee
and upheld student-initiated graduation prayer.
61. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
62. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5'" Cir. 1999), rehearing en
bane denied, 171 F.3d 1013 (5'" Cir. 1999).
63. 528 U.S. 1002 (1999).
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Court, in a six to three vote, affirmed that the policy was unconstitutional.65
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found that just as
in Lee, prayer at a school-sponsored event, whether a football
game or a graduation ceremony, violated the Establishment
66
Clause. However, in Santa Fe, Stevens relied on the endorsement test rather than Kennedy's psychological coercion test.
Put another way, Stevens reviewed the status of prayer from
the perspective of whether its being permitted at football
games was an impermissible governmental approval or endorsement rather than as a form of psychological coercion
which subjected fans to values and/or beliefs other than their
own. In vitiating the prayer golicy, Stevens rejected the district's three main arguments. First, Justice Stevens disagreed
with the district's position that the policy furthered the free
68
speech rights of students. He argued that the policy did not
create a limited public forum as, for example, in Rosenberger u.
69
Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, where the university had to pay for a student publication with a religious
perspective, because the district policy in Santa Fe limited
speech to one single student for an entire season. At the same
time, Stevens was unconvinced that the prayer was student,
rather than government, speech since the district chose the
process by which a student would be selected, the purpose of
the message, and when the message would be delivered,
namely at a regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function, on
school property using a public address system that was under
the control of school officials. Consequently, Stevens was of the
opinion that a majoritarian process cannot be used to shut out
the views of a minority insofar as the selection process assured

64. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's ruling and possible outcomes, see Ralph
D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Student Prayers at Public School Sporting Events:
Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 143 EDUC. L. REP. 415 (2000).
65. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000) Justice Stevens's
majority opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and
Breyer.
66. See id. at 2274.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 2287.
69. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that the University's policy of funding the publications of student organizations could not be used to deny funding for a publication
with a religious perspective as this was viewpoint discrimination which violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
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that minority candidates would never have the opportunity to
deliver a message and that their views would be effectively silenced.
Stevens rejected the district's second argument, facial neutrality, despite its claim that it had secular goals and purposes:
to solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and
student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment
for the competition. Stevens responded that in relying on the
perceptions of an objective student, the alleged secular goals
were a sham since based on the district's history of permitting
70
prayer at events it was, in effect, board-sponsored prayer. He
also rejected the district's use of two separate student elections
as a sham and its claims that prayer at football games was less
coercive than at graduations because even if most students
could chose to skip the pregame prayer, a number of participants, such as band members, cheerleaders, and players had to
be there, indicating that prayer had the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship. Stevens posited that the policy, which encouraged the selection of a religious message and furthered only one specific
kind of message, an invocation, did not further a secular purpose.
Turning to the district's attempted third defense, Stevens
almost dismissed out of hand its position that claims for relief
were premature since there was no certainty that any of the
statements or invocations would be religious until a student actually delivered a solemnizing message. He decided that the
policy's unconstitutional purpose was reflected by the board's
involvement in the election of the speaker and content of the
message coupled with language in the policy identifying what
he viewed as the clearly preferred message of a traditional religious invocation. This led Stevens to conclude that even if no
student in the school system ever offered a religious message,
the policy was unconstitutional because of the district's at71
tempt to encourage prayer.
2. Supreme Court Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent began by declaring that
Justice Stevens's opinion "bristles with hostility to all things
70. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2278.
71. Id. at 2279.
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72

religious in public life." What Rehnquist apparently considered most disturbing was, in light of the fact that the policy
was never implemented, Stevens's refusal to defer to the district's purposes as other than religious and dismissing them as
a sham.
Rehnquist viewed the issue in Santa Fe as student, not
government, speech where, unlike Lee's having a prayer delivered by a rabbi under the direction of a school official, the policy allowed prayer to be selected or created by a pupil. As
Rehnquist asserted, if the student had been selected on wholly
secular criteria, such as public speaking skills or social popularity, he or she could have delivered a religious message that
73
would likely have passed constitutional muster.

B. Mitchell v. Helms
14

Mitchell v. Helms, a case with a lengthy procedural history,75 originally involved three issues, only the third of which
reached the Supreme Court. In the parts of the case that were
not accepted on a}i?peal, the Fifth Circuit held that following
Agostini v. Felton, wherein the Court upheld the on-site delivery of federally funded remedial programs in religious schools
for poor students in New York City, a Louisiana statute allowing the on-site delivery of special education services in religious
schools was constitutional. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed that
a nonprofit corporation that paid for transporting children to
and from their religious schools was constitutional. The most
contentious part of the case at issue before t!)e Supreme Court
involved the Fifth Circuit's striking down of Chapter 2 of Title
I, now Title VI, of the Elementary and Secondary Education

72. Id. at 2283 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent
was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
73. Id. at 2287.
74. Helms v. Cody, 856 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. La. 1994), affd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998), opinion amended and
reh'g denied by Helms v. Picard, 165 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom.
Mitchell v. Helms, 119 S. Ct. 2336 (1999).
75. The programs in Helms addressed the use of public funds in religious schools
beginning in the early 1980s. For a background story on the litigation, see Mark Walsh,
A Parish Offering, Eouc. WEEK, Nov. 10, 1999, 37-40. The originally named plaintiff,
Mary Helms, had a daughter in the Jefferson Parish School District; the named defendant/respondent has changed with each new State Superintendent of Education.
76. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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Act, a comprehensive federal statute that permits the loans of
instructional materials such as library books, computers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps to nonpublic schools.

1. Supreme Court Majority Opinion
78

In a six to three vote, a splintered Court, as expected, in a
79
plurality opinion authored by Justice Thomas, reversed the
judgment of the Fifth Circuit and upheld the constitutionality
of Chapter 2. Although not explicitly naming it, Thomas expanded the parameters of the Child Benefit test, under which
governmental aid, in the forms of books, transportation, and
now, instructional materials, including computers, is available
to students who attend religious schools. Thomas acknowledged that Agostini modified the seemingly ubiquitous tripar80
tite Lemon test, used in more than thirty cases in this area,
(which asks whether governmental aid has a secular legislative
purpose, has a principle or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and does not create excessive entanglement) by reviewing only its first two parts while recasting entanglement as one criterion in determining a statute's
effect. Further, since the purpose part of the test was not challenged, Thomas found it necessary only to consider the effects
of Chapter 2.
As a threshold concern, Justice Thomas decided that Chapter 2 did not foster impermissible religious indoctrination since
the aid was allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria
that neither favored nor disfavored religion and was available
to all schools on a nondiscriminatory basis. Thomas next rejected two rules that the dissent would have relied on governing Chapter 2-type aid-that direct, nonincidental assistance
was impermissible and that aid to religious schools was unconstitutional if it could be diverted to sectarian purposes-as inconsistent with the Court's recent holdings. In the process, Justice Thomas reversed those parts of Meek u. Pittenger and
77. 20 u.s. c.§§ 7301-73.
78. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's ruling and possible outcomes, see Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, Giving with One Hand and Taking with the Other:
State Aid to Religiously Affiliated NonPublic Schools,140 EDUC. L. REP. 807 (2000).
79. Justice Thomas's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy.
80. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (internal citations omitted).
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Wolman u. Walter that struck down programs that delivered
many of the same types of aid as Chapter 2.
After rebuffing Justice Souter's fears that aid would lead to
political divisiveness, Thomas applied two principles from
Agostini in holding that Chapter 2 did not have the effect of
advancing religion. First, he noted that Chapter 2 recipients
are not defined by reference to religion in reiterating that the
aid is available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all schools on
the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion. Second, he maintained that Chapter 2 did not
foster governmental indoctrination of religion since eligibility
was not only determined on a neutral basis, using a broad array of criteria, without regard to whether a school was religious, but also because parents made private choices in selecting where their children would be educated. Thomas thus held
that Chapter 2 did not have the effect of advancing religion
even though the aid could be described as "direct" since it was
81
"nonideological" and there was no evidence that any of the
82
equipment was diverted to religious purposes.
2. Supreme Court Concurrence
3

In her lengthy concurrence, Justice O'Conno/ agreed with
the result but was concerned that Justice Thomas went too far,
since his position might uphold any form of aid to students in
religious schools that is secular and offered on a neutral basis.
More specifically, while acknowledging that neutrality is an
important reason for upholding government-aid programs in
the face of Establishment Clause challenges, she added that,
"we have never held that a government-aid program passes
constitutional muster solely because of the neutral criteria it
84
employs as a basis for distributing aid." Moreover, in agreeing
with the dissent to the extent that the Court never upheld an
evenhanded approach to aid as the sole basis for satisfying the

81. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2553 (2000) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §7372).
82. For a recent case involving issues similar to Helms, see Freedom from Religion Found. v. Bugher, 55 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (upholding a state subsidy of
an Internet link to assist schools, some of which were religiously affiliated, but striking
down direct cash grants to the religious schools as there were no restrictions on the use
of the funds).
83. To the surprise of many, Justice O'Connor's concurrence was joined by Justice
Breyer, ordinarily a separationist.
84. Helms, 120 S. Ct. at 2557.
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Establishment Clause, Justice O'Connor refused to discount
the importance of determining whether aid directly aids religious schools. To this end, she found it necessary to distinguish
programs where the aid is based on private choice from those
with a per-capita basis such as Chapter 2 programs. In adopting this line of analysis, Justice O'Connor found cases such as
Witters and Zobrest acceptable because aid based on the private
choice of students or parents makes them look less like a direct
subsidy. On the other hand, she was concerned that per-capita
aid programs create a public perception that, if the religious
school uses the aid to inculcate religion, the government has
sent a message of endorsement. Yet, she offered that, if privatechoice and per-capita programs are treated the same, there is
no reason to preclude the government from providing direct
money payments to religious organizations, including churches,
based on the number of persons who belong to each organization.
In sum, while she was concerned with Justice Thomas's approval of diversion of government aid for religious indoctrination, she was satisfied that the Chapter 2 aid, which supplemented rather than supplanted federal aid, neither resulted in
government indoctrination nor defined recipients by reference
to religion. Further, Justice O'Connor was content not only that
there were sufficient monitoring procedures in place to avoid
the risk of diverting government funds to religious purposes,
but also that over four years of discovery covering fifteen years
of aid to religious schools revealed only "de minimis" instances
85
of"actual diversion."
3. Supreme Court Dissent

Justice Souter's lengthy and strident dissent voiced his fear
that Justice Thomas's opinion was a radical departure from the
Court's precedent that risked "compelling an individual to support religion [which] violates the fundamental principle of free86
dom of conscience." He was also concerned that Thomas's
opinion violated the prohibition against governmental establishment of religion by providing substantial aid to religious
schools, and "government establishment of religion is inextri-

85. Id. at 2562.
86. /d. at 2574. As anticipated, Justice Souter's dissent was joined by Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg. Helms, 120 S. Ct. at 2572 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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IV. REFLECTIONS

Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe and Mitchell v.
Helms, although clearly addressing different issues in the wide
range of Church-State relations, evidenced not only the ongoing deep divide within the Court but also a kind of internal
consistency among the Justices as the majority and dissent essentially changed sides in Santa Fe and Helms. In viewing
Helms and Santa Fe together, it is fascinating to observe the
split among the Supreme Court Justices, especially as the potential near-term vacancies based on the age and or health
concerns of several Justices may lead to very different results
in this closely-contested arena. At present, the Justices fit into
three fairly consistent categories. Chief Justice Rehnquist
88
along with Justices Scalia and Thomas are accommodationists who would permit state aid to students in religious schools
and prayer in public schools. At the other end of the bench,
89
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer are separationists.90 The two moderates, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
typically tip the Court's balance by joining either the accommodationists or the separationists.
Of the two cases, Helms appears to be more far-reaching
than Santa Fe for two reasons. First, Helms is likely to have a
greater impact than Santa Fe because estimates are that more
than one million children in the United States benefit from
87. !d. at 2575.
88. During Justice Thomas's first five years on the High Court, he and Justice
Scalia voted together 80% of the time. At the same time, Justice Breyer voted with Justice Souter 84% of the time, while Justice Ginsberg voted with Justice Souter 80% of
the time. Daniel E. Troy, The Court's Mr. Right, NATIONAL REV., Aug. 9, 1999 at 39-41.
89. Perhaps the biggest surprise in Helms was that Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor's concurrence.
90. For a discussion of the attitudes of the ,Justices with regard to their ideological stances, see Charles J. Russo & Allan G. Osborne, Agostini v. Felton: Is the Demise
of the Ghoul at Hand? 116 EDUC. L. R~;p_ 515 (1997). Predicting the results in a Supreme Court case can be risky business because the Justices do not always follow
through on their word. See e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), wherein even
though a majority of Justices had voiced their displeasure with the Lemon test, Justice
Kennedy's opinion struck down prayer at public school graduation ceremonies on the
basis that it was psychologically coercive, thus allowing Lemon to survive. For a discussion of the perspectives of the Justices prior to Lee, see Ralph D. Mawdsley &
Charles J. Russo, High School Prayers at Graduation: Will the Supreme Court Pronounce the Benediction~ 69 EDUC. L. REP. 189 (1991).
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Chapter 2. Further, combining Justice Thomas's discussion of
the importance of the private choices of parents with the
Court's having issued a stay of a preliminary injunction
granted by a federal trial court judge concerning the voucher
91
program in Cleveland, Ohio, an argument can be made that
Helms might pave the way for a favorable ruling on vouchers
and additional forms of aid to religious schools. Although such
a result is certainly speculative at this time in light of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, Justice Thomas's plurality opinion
added fuel to the fire because he relied on the principles of neutrality and the private choices of parents in deciding where to
send their children to school, buzz words that are often used by
supporters ofvouchers.
The second reason why Helms appears to be of greater significance is that Santa Fe essentially follows a virtually unbroken line of almost forty years of Supreme Court cases prohibit92
ing prayer in public schools that began with Engel v. Vitale.
Conversely, Helms continues to clarify the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence by expanding the boundaries of
permissible state aid to religious schools.
In light of the potential impact of Santa Fe and Helms, the
91. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (generally upholding
the constitutionality of a school voucher program against an Establishment Clause
challenge since the offending provision, which gave priority to students whose parents
belonged to a religious group that supported a sectarian school was severable from the
rest of the statute). But see Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp.2d 725 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (enjoining the same statute on the basis that since the majority of schools that
received aid were religiously affiliated, the moving party demonstrated the likelihood
of prevailing on the merits), stay granted in part, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 1999 WL
669222 (N.D. Ohio Aug 27, 1999), stay granted, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 120 S. Ct.
443 (1999) (pending final disposition by the Sixth Circuit); Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,
72 F. Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that the statute, by which the state paid a
portion of participating students tuition at non public schools or public schools adjacent
to a city school district violated the Establishment Clause). See also, Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364 (1999) (affirming
that a state tuition statute that excluded religious schools from receiving state funds
did not violate the Establishment Clause); Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1'' Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999) (affirming that a state statute that authorized
direct grants to nonsectarian high schools as reimbursement for the cost of educating
students who did not have a public school available did not violate the Establishment
Clause); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), motion for reconsideration
withdrawn, 588 N.W.2d 635 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998) (holding that
a parental choice program that afforded parents the opportunities to select the schools
that their children attended, and which included religiously affiliated non public schools
violated neither the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment nor the state constitution's religious establishment provisions).
92. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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next two sections of this article reflect on whether there is any
legitimate basis for the Chief Justice's concerns and the interplay between the opinions of Justices Thomas and O'Connor on
whether the Court may, in fact, be moving toward fashioning a
new standard out of the increasingly weak Lemon test. The article wraps up with a brief consideration of the future make-up
of the High Court bench.
A. Hostility to Religion

An interesting dynamic emerged in the interplay between
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Santa Fe, joined by Justice
Thomas, and Justice Thomas's plurality opinion in Helms,
which, in turn, was joined by the Chief Justice. Rehnquist's assertions that Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Santa Fe
3
"bristles with hostility to all thin~s religious in public life"H
4
and that it was "openly hostile" are not entirely without
merit, given Stevens's almost summary rejection of the board's
stated purpose regarding the pregame invocation/message, "to
95
96
solemnize the event [football game]," as a "sham." If a stated
purpose "to solemnize [an] event" by having an invocation or
benediction at a graduation is unacceptable under the Establishment Clause, it should not be too surprising that the same
result would apply to a similar pronouncement before a football
game. In defense of Stevens's position, the question becomes
whether the Court was hostile to religion in refusing to permit
the school district to allow student-initiated and led graduation
invocations/benedictions where no secular counterpart to the
prayers was present or whether it was merely maintaining a
necessary separation of Church and State.
The Chief Justice's concerns aside, it is not clear that separationists have evidenced the hostility to religion that he
feared. Yet, since separationists have neither been receptive to
prayer in public schools nor aid to students in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools, an interesting question can be raised.
In light of the second prong of Lemon, which prohibits the government from advancing or inhibiting religion, one can only
wonder why Rehnquist has not raised this question sooner

93.
94.
95.
96.

Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2283 (2000).
!d. at 2286.
Id. at 2273.
ld. at 2278.
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since, in many cases, an argument can be made that some
strict separationists, if not harboring outright hostility to religion, have handed down rulings that have had a chilling effect
on religion.!J? Perhaps Rehnquist has only now reached his
breaking point.
Justice Thomas's opinion in Helms also highlighted a latent
hostility to religion, or at least Roman Catholicism, in his brief
98
discussion of the Blaine Amendment. The Blaine Amendment
of 1875 would have amended the Constitution to bar any aid to
sectarian institutions, using the term "religious sect," an open
code word for Catholic, at a time of wide-spread hostility to the
99
Catholic Church and Catholics. In fact, it was not until almost
100
a century later, in Hunt u. McNair,
a case involving federal
aid in higher education, that the Court eliminated this confusion by coining the term "pervasively sectarian" in referring to
all religious schools.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Thomas's concerns
97. See, e.g., Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 104 7 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1218 (1992) (preventing a teacher from reading the Bible during class time and
removing The Bible in Pictures and The Story of Jesus from his classroom library while
books on Greek gods and goddesses and American Indian religions remain on the
shelves); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1095 (1995) (upholding the removal of a portrait of Christ, painted by a
graduate of the school, that had been posed on the wall of a public high school for thirty
years); and C. H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that a board of education did not violate the First Amendment rights of a first grade student when school
officials changed the location of his poster of Jesus and prevented him from reading
Bible stories to his classmates).
98. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2551 (2000).
99. The Blaine Amendment, introduced by Representative James G. Blaine of
Maine, which passed the House by an overwhelming majority of 180 in favor to 7 opposed, failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate, as 28 Senators favored it while 16 were opposed to it, read:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State, for the
support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor
shall any money so raised, or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects
or denominations.
Available on line at <http:www.baylor.edu/-Church-State/Blaine_Amendment.htmb.
For additional background, see Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Blaine Amendment of
1875: Private Motives for Political Action, 42 CATIIOLlC HISTORICAL REV. 15 (1956).
100. 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding a South Carolina statute that provided aid to
colleges and universities, including ones that were religiously affiliated, by permitting
them to issue revenue bonds for projects, excluding facilities for sectarian study or religious worship, where the institutions conveyed the projects to the state authority
which would lease them back and reconvey them on payment of the bonds with limitations being placed on their use before and after reconveyance).
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notwithstanding, the Court has never clearly endorsed hostility
to religion. For example, in Board of Education of Westside
101
Community Schools v. Mergens, Justice O'Connor applied the
02
effects prong of Lemon in interpreting the Equal Access Ace
as meaning that the statute's "message is one of neutrality
rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious
groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate
103
not neutrality but hostility toward religion." The notion that
the Establishment Clause requires neutrality when government deals with religion has gained acceptance with the pre104
sent Supreme Court under both the Free Speech
and Free
105
Exercise Clauses.
The concept of neutrality can take on different shades of
meaning depending on the applicable criteria. In only one case,
Corporation of The Presiding Bisho~ of The Church of Jesus
06
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, has the Supreme Court
101. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). For a discussion of Mergens, see Charles J. Russo &
David L. Gregory, The Return of School Prayer: Reflections on the Libertarian-Conservative Dilemma, 20 J. L. AND EDUC. 164 (1991). For an update on the status
of the Equal Access Act, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Noncurriculum Related Student
Groups Under the Equal Access Act, 137 EDUC. L. REP. 865 (1999).
102. The Equal Access Act, in the relevant section, provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to
deny access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open
forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of the speech at such meetings.
20 U.S. C. § 4071(a).
103. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.
104. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846
(1995) ("requir(ing] public officials to scan and interpret student publications to discern
their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and belief... [would be] a denial of the right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires.").
105. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeh, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (in
striking down four city ordinances that had the sole effect of prohibiting animal sacrifice by Santaria, a syncretistic religion, the Court declared that, "[o]fficial action that
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects
against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt.")
106. 483 U.S. 327, 337-38 (1987) (upholding a statutory amendment for religious
organizations from the prohibition against discrimination in employment under Title
VII on the basis of religion):
A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to
advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the gov-
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upheld, against an Establishment Clause challenge, a governmental accommodation of religion that did not also benefit
secular entities. However, in Amos, an expanded exemption for
religious organizations under Title VII served to eliminate judicial need to determine whether the activities of employees
were related to their employer's religious mission. In any event,
in Amos the Court did not claim that Congressional refusal to
expand the Title VII exemption would have evidenced hostility
towards religion.
The question has thus become whether a court is hostile to
religion if it looks beyond the expressed purposes for government action and searches past practices for the real intent of
officials. Put another way, one can wonder whether Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Santa Fe is correct; that the majority demonstrated hostility toward religion by refusing to accept
facially the school officials' stated purpose for the pregame invocation/message. An alternative way of addressing this question considers whether the search for intent by looking at past
practice runs the risk of looking to, and/or impugning, the motives of school officials who are responsible for creating and enforcing school policies. The Supreme Court has frequently expressed concern that the constitutionality of government action
107
should not depend entirely on the motives of public officials.
For example, in Mergens, regarding the passage of the Equal
Access Act, the Court observed:
Even if some legislators were motivated by a conviction that
religious speech in particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone would not invalidate the Act, because what
is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the
possible religious motives of the legislators who enacted the
law.los
Yet, the Court went on to note that "the Act on its face
h ,109 a
grants equa1 access to b ot h secu1ar an d re11gwus speec ,
0

107.
Wallace
108.
109.

0

ernment itself has advanced religion through its own activities and
influence ... Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we
see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with
benefits to secular entities.
For one noticeable exception where a legislator's motives came into play, see
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249.
Id.
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comparison that is difficult to make with a graduation "invocation/ benediction" policy that allows only for prayer.uo
In the end, one can question whether past practice or intent
of school officials is relevant in Santa Fe in terms of whether
the Court is hostile toward religion. Perhaps equally significant
is to consider whether the process that the district official
sought to use to permit students to determine, by means of two
separate secret votes, whether to have an invocation/benediction was only window dressing, a subterfuge to
mask its own goal. One must consider whether the process by
which a decision is reached, whether by school officials in Lee
or by students in Santa Fe, matters if the end result is the
same, namely the use of prayer. If a policy that permits either
an invocation or message before a football game violates the
Establishment Clause where, at least theoretically, a nonreligious message is possible, then a policy permitting only an invocation and/or benediction would seem to be even more in
jeopardy.
It is important to consider whether refusal to permit students to elect to have a prayer at graduation represents hostility toward religion. Justice Stevens's perspective regarding
prayer at football games seems to suggest that graduation
prayers would be unconstitutional if they were based on a past
practice of prayer. For school districts with such a past practice, Santa Fe offers no constitutional hope. When students are
not even provided with the opportunity to cast a secret ballot,
which, in effect, determines whether they wish to continue a
past practice, one wonders whether such a decision, on its face,
evidences opposition to religion. The question becomes how one
defines neutrality if one eradicates a secret ballot process simply because it allows for the possibility of a religious message.
At the same time, it is unclear which may be more threatening
to the interpretation of the Establishment Clause, the intent of
school officials, community members, and a majority of students to make a minimal religious statement, or the intent of a
majority of the Supreme Court to eliminate an event simply because it might be religious. While it is true that constitutional
rights are not, and should not be subject to a majority vote, the
Court needs to address the clear tension that has arisen as activist judges at all levels seek to interpret the Constitution

110. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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based on their own judicial philosophies almost without regard
for the will of the people.
If Santa Fe represents hostility, despite the desire of school
officials and voters in a school district to have invocations or
benedictions at graduation, then, perhaps, the result represents the hostility of equality. An impressive uphill battle in
the Supreme Court over the past decade has assured that religious individuals and/or organizations will have access, equal
111
to claimants with secular reasons, to public school facilities
112
and resources.
:However, the reliance on equality to reach
this point seems to have its price. To permit prayers at graduation where no secular counterpart is available seems, arguably,
to be changing the rules.m Having been forced onto a playing
field where neutrality is defined by the presence of a secular
counterpart, school districts will continue to find use of graduation invocations/benedictions difficult to defend. In sum, even if
the separationists lack overt hostility to religion, given the role
that it has played, and continues to occupy, in shaping American life, perhaps the Court needs to move beyond mere neutrality and find a way to afford religion a greater voice in the marketplace of ideas. The role of neutrality also continues to play a
central role in cases where state aid, rather than prayer, is at
issue as the Court struggles to define an appropriate measure
for evaluating the constitutionality of programs which provide

111. See, e.g., Mergens, 496 U.S. at 226; Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (upholding, essentially as an extension of Mergens,
a religious group's right to show a film on family values and child-rearing on the basis
that the school district's refusal to grant them access to facilities was impermissible
viewpoint discrimination against religion). The Supreme Court recently agreed to hear
an appeal in a similar case wherein the Second Circuit upheld a ban against permitting
a nondenominational children's club to engage in religious instruction and prayer in a
public school. The Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000),
cert. granted, 2000 WL 838152 (Oct 10, 2000).
112. To Rosenberger u. Rector of" the University of" Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 846
(1995) can be added a genre of Supreme Court cases upholding access to government
aid on the premises of religious schools against an Establishment Clause challenge, but
where that aid was the same as that available to students in public schools. See Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997); and, Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
113. Arguably, a school district's selecting students based on academic performance to speak at graduation with the possibility that some, or all, might incorporate
religious messages would not run afoul of the Establishment Clause as long as students are free to select their own content. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 7 F.
Supp.2d 1110 (D. Idaho 1997), affd 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, opinion
withdrawn, 165 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999).
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public funds that assist students who attend religiouslyaffiliated nonpublic schools.
B. Establishment Clause Test
Prior to Santa Fe and Helms, the Court has relied on essentially three tests when interpreting the Establishment Clause,
most commonly the Lemon test. Although not supported by all
114
current members of the Court,
the Lemon test has demonstrated a remarkable resiliency, often coming back from the
115
edge of oblivion.
Even though Justice O'Connor's endorse1
ment test, suggested as a standard to replace Lemon H> in disputes where state aid was not at issue and enunciated in her
117
concurrence in L;mch v. Donnelly,
has been applied with
11
some frequency, prior to Santa Fe it had not been followed by
119
the majority opinion in any education case. The most recent
114. Over the years, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have voiced
concerns over the Lemon test. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined
by, Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 107-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. In one of his more colorful metaphors, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Lambs Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398, mused that, "[!]ike some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union
Free School District."
116. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 68 (in concurring with invalidation of Alabama statute permitting prayer along with moment of silence at beginning of school day, Justice
O'Connor observed that, "[d]espite its initial promise, the Lemon test has proved problematic.").
117. 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upheld the display of a
creche among secular symbols).
118. Even though Justice O'Connor's endorsement test in Lynch was formulated in
a nonschool setting, the Court applied it in the next four cases involving the Establishment Clause in disputes surrounding K-12 education. See Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1982) (striking down a state law requiring balanced treatment of creation science and evolution as violating the Establishment Clause); School Dist. v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Jaff"ree, 472 U.S. 38. Surprisingly, the test was ignored in subsequent cases not involving K-12 education. See,
e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding the Adolescent Family Life Act
even though it aided public and non public organizations that provided services related
to the care of pregnant adolescents and the prevention of sexual relationships in this
age group); Amos, 483 U.S. 327; Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986).
119. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (where, in addition to upholding a reli-
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test, psychological coercion, created by Justice Kennedy, has
120
only appeared as controlling in Lee v. Weisman.
121
Justice Stevens's exgress language
and reliance on Su2
preme Court precedene in Santa Fe initially suggested that
the two-part endorsement test is increasingly being relied on
rather than Lemon. While Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct
that Justice Stevens, in assessing the facial constitutionality of
the pregame policy, did refer to "the three factors first articu123
lated in Lemon u. Kurtzman," the latter actually considered
only the secular purpose prong in concluding that the policy

gious group's right of access to public school facilities, the Court, in refuting the district's Establishment Clause defense using endorsement language also inexplicably
cited to Lemon: "there would have been no realistic danger that the community would
think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed ... "). For a
noneducation case where the endorsement test represented the majority view, see Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573 (holding, inter alia, that the erection of a creche on steps inside
of a courthouse violated the Establishment Clause as it resulted in the endorsement of
Christianity).
120. 505 U.S. 577. However, four justices in Lee also held that the use of a graduation prayer violated the endorsement test. !d. at 577.
[TJhe Establishment Clause is infringed when the government
makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the
political community. Direct government action endorsing religion or
a particular religious practice is invalid under this approach because it sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community.
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting from Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, concurring
in judgment)).
See also 505 U.S. at 618 (Souter, concurring) ("Over the years, this Court has declared
the invalidity of many non coercive state laws and practices conveying a message of religious endorsement.").
121. The majority's conclusion that the district's policy "has the purpose and creates the perception of encouraging delivery of prayer at a series of important school
events," Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2283 (2000), seems to be the
logical result of such language in the decision as "[t]he actual or perceived endorsement
of the message," and "our objective student's perception that the prayer is, in actuality,
encouraged by the school." !d. at 2278.
122. .Justice Stevens's majority opinion, in seeking authority for interpretation of
the Establishment Clause looked to three of Justice O'Connor's concurrences which relied on the endorsement test. !d. at 2278. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding the right of the
Ku Klux Klan to erect an unattended cross on grounds at a state capitol); Jaffree, 472
U.S. rrt 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984)(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The number of references, and prominence,
given that Justice Stevens gives to Justice O'Connor's views on endorsement, albeit
only in concurring opinions, seems more than a coincidence.
123. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. rrt 2282.
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124

had "an unconstitutional purpose."
If the endorsement test
has a purpose part, it is unclear whether its reliance on Lemon
represents a redundancy or a substantive difference in meaning between the purpose parts of the two tests.
The endorsement test enunciated by Justice O'Connor
sought to modify Lemon by creating a two-part test:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community. Government can run
afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere with the independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to government or governmental powers not
fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the
creation of political constituencies defined along religious
lines. The second and more direct infringement is government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
125
message.
In further explaining her stance on the governmental endorsement of religion, Justice O'Connor called for modifications
to both the purpose and effect tests in Lemon:
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.
The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's
actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice
126
invalid.
Justice O'Connor subsequently added th;::.t, in measuring
perception, the relevant issue is "how it would be perceived by
an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative his127
tory, and implementation of the [government action]." Justice
O'Connor has also attempted to provide definition to purpose

124. !d.
125. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88. (internal citations omitted).
126. !d. at 690.
127. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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under the endorsement test. For example, in Wallace u.
128
Jaffree, she pointed out that what is required is that "the legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian en12
dorsements from its laws." Adding that a review oflegislative
1
purpose requires "a deferential and limited" :Jo inquiry, she
noted that "our courts are capable of distinguishing a sham
131
secular purpose from a sincere one." Further, she cautioned
that courts have "no license to psychoanalyze the legislators ...
[or to] denigrate an expressed secular purpose due to postenactment testimony by particular legislators or by interested
132
persons who witnessed the drafting of the statute." Relyin£
1
on a statute's "history, language, and administration,"
O'Connor observed "there can be little doubt that the purpose
and likely effect of this [moment of silence] enactment is to en134
dorse and sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools."
Another uncertainty is whether the use of the purpose
prong of the endorsement test would have produced the same
result in Santa Fe as Lemon's purpose test did. Even so, it is
worth acknowledging that in Wallace, Justice O'Connor suggested caution in finding a nonsecular purpose under the endorsement test while also cautioning that her concern can apply in a case not involving a facial challenge to a moment of
silence statute. Using Lemon's purpose prong to mount a facial
challenge to the policy in Santa Fe may have far-reaching implications for student choice and Establishment Clause litigation. As Chief Justice Rehn~uist declared, the Court "applie[d]
3
Lemon's factors stringently" fi in determining not only whether
the school district's policy would inevitably violate the Establishment Clause even though it was never put into effect, but

128. 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 68. In invalidating the moment of silence statute, the Court noted that
the state legislature had created a nonsecular purpose by the addition of the words "or
voluntary prayer."
130. !d. at 75.
131. !d.
132. !d.
133. !d. Part of the past history of the moment of silence statute involved prior
statutes that had permitted teachers to lead students in group prayers. The moment of
silence statute, by adding "or voluntary prayer" was perceived as an attempt to express
prayer as a state-favored manner of using the silence.
134. !d. at 67.
135. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2284 (2000) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
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whether it may be applied in violation of the Establishment
Clause.
Justice Stevens's position in Santa Fe suggests that, even
in the absence of direct action by school officials, courts are free
to make their own "worst-case" assumptions about what might
136
occur, with the potential for chilling effects. Thus, in presenting a facial challenge to a school district policy, this position
holds that student choice will result in three cascading decisions: a majority vote to have a pregame invocation/message; a
vote to select a person who is likely to present a religious message; and, a pregame message that is, in fact, religious. If, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggested, the majority relied
on the Lemon purpose test because the purpose part of the endorsement test has never been used in a facial challenge to a
137
government action, it is interesting to consider whether one
can reasonably assume that the endorsement purpose test will
take on the same strict definition as Lemon and be used in future facial challenges. As noted, Chief Justice Rehnquist feared
that while this was so, this convergence of definition may
eliminate the endorsement test altogether.
In light of Justice Thomas's neutrality test in Helms and
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Santa Fe, which addressed
endorsement as "the most rigid version of the oft-criticized test
138
of Lemon u. Kurtzman," the status of Justice O'Connor's test
is unclear. That is, given Lemon's resiliency and the Court's inability, or unwillingness, to adopt the endorsement test, future
litigation may focus on whether there is need for a separate
endorsement test or if meaning must be drawn from Lemon. If
anything, Lemon's resiliency was evident in Helms, wherein
Justice Thomas's plurality opinion enunciated a neutrality test
that retained Lemon's purpose and effects prongs while relegat136. For a similar line of judicial decision-making, Justice Brennan's majority
opinion in Aguilar u. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), struck down New York City's practice
of delivering Title I services on site in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools even
though there were no allegations of impropriety based on his fear that such a relationship might have created excessive entanglement between the schools and the government.
137. Ironically, in Board of Education of Westside Community Schools u. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990), the first school-related case involving the Establishment Clause
wherein Justice O'Connor authored the opinion of the Court, she relied on Lemon
rather than the endorsement. In any event, Mergens did not involve a facial challenge
to the Equal Access Act since the litigation involved a school district's refusal to recognize a request for a religious club under the Act.
138. Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2284.
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ing excessive entanglement as one of three factors to be considered in determining effect. The other two factors under Thomas's revised effects test are whether an action results in governmental indoctrination and whether it defines its recipients
by reference to religion.
Justice Thomas's neutrality test, distilled from a combination of Establishment Clause cases involving various forms of
139
140
.
.
1e
governmen t ai"d an d f ree speech c1mms,
presen t s a s1mp
measure. Under this test, government aid that benefits religious schools is constitutional as long as it is neutral and results from private choice. The benefit of this test to religious
schools is obvious: private choice is an intrinsic feature of all
religious schools since a student's presence can be accounted
for only by a parent and/or student choice to attend. The down
side is, as discussed below, the apparent relative ease with
which a challenge can be mounted against the constitutionality
of aid.
Neutrality, which may provide religious schools access to
resources that are available to public school students, gives religious institutions broad access to a wide range of instructional equipment and materials. The only monitoring necessary
for public school officials is to evaluate whether print and visual materials such as videotapes have religious content. Under
the neutrality test, concerns as to how a religious school
chooses to use its Chapter 2 equipment or materials are no
longer relevant. However, Justice Thomas's plurality opinion
appears to lack the votes to change the Establishment Clause
test across the board. Thus, the courts remain in limbo, lacking
a clear standard because Justice O'Connor's concurrence retains some elements of the older Establishment Clause analysis. Religious schools might become ineligible for benefits under
per-capita aid programs such as Chapter 2, which is based on
student enrollments, as opposed to private-choice programs,
represented by individual applications for benefits in such
139. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (reh'g denied, Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 4 75 U.S. 1091 (1986)); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
140. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993) (prohibiting viewpoint discrimination in permitting a religious group to usc of
public school facilities) Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(prohibiting viewpoint discrimination in requiring a university to fund a student publication with religious content).
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cases as Zobrest and Witters. Justice O'Connor would find government assistance constitutionally suspect if benefits were not
supplemental to resources already available in religious
schools, if the aid supplanted funds available to the school from
nonfederal sources, and/or if there was evidence that the assistance had been, or was being, diverted to religious uses.
For many religious schools, Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test, at least in its present version in Helms, would be difficult,
if not impossible, to meet. For example, limiting the use of a
VCR and monitor, purchased through Chapter 2, to play only
nonreligious tapes may be neither feasible nor practicable.
Similarly, restricting an overhead projector to use only for instruction in nonreligious subjects may be all but impossible in
a pervasively religious school that integrates the Bible into all
instruction. Even though Justice O'Connor placed the burden
of proof on the one challenging the diversion of government
funds, the relative ease by which this burden can be met
141
through discovery is evident in Helms.
One can argue that Justice O'Connor's distinction between
private-choice and per-capita programs is no longer viable after
Agostini, wherein her majority opinion upheld the use of publicly-paid teachers on-site in religious schools to provide Title I
remedial instruction in reading and mathematics for students
in a low-income area, even though the children, who were selected to receive the assistance, were individually identified by
their teachers and never made application for the help. By providing publicly funded services to large numbers of students
who were eligible without personally requesting help, and
where all but fifty-eight of the 22,000 eligible students in New
York City who attended nonpublic schools attended ones that
142
were religiously affiliated, Agostini arguably represented a
break from Zobrest and Witters, wherein the recipients of aid
sought it out. In Zobrest, the student received the services of a
sign language interpreter due to the active participation of his
parents in the educational process, while in Witters, the blind
student was initially able to participate in the program at issue
because he had to make an individual application for assis141. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct 2530 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (highlighting
documentation demonstrating that Title I equipment was used in the classrooms for
religious indoctrination and that a computer purchased with Title I funds was used to
back-up a school's master computer when it failed).
142. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 252 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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tance. It is unclear how far this analysis can go since Justice
Souter's dissent in Agostini reads very much the same as Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion's concerns in Helms:
[S]tudents eligible for such [remedial] programs may not apply directly for Title I funds. The aid, accordingly, is not even
formally aid to the individual students (and even formally individual aid must be seen as aid to a school system when so
many individuals receive it that it becomes a feature of the
143
system).

At least for the present, the distinction between assistance
to individual students in religious schools, even if a large number of students as in Agostini, and resources to a religious
school for use with all children, as in Helms, represents an important dividing line. While States may choose to follow the
Helms plurality and provide assistance to religious schools,
they would be well advised to not ignore Justice O'Connor's
concerns.
Their limitations aside, the plurality and concurring opinions in Helms offer a ray of hope to parents who lack resources
to send their children to religious schools. Subject to any
changes on the High Court Bench, it appears that a majority
exists to uphold a voucher plan under the Establishment
Clause, as long as the program provides benefits to students in
both public and nonpublic schools. Presumably, as long as
voucher funds could be used to attend public or nonpublic
schools, the plurality's evenhandedness test is likely to be satisfied. Likewise, a voucher program dependent on individual
applications should allay Justice O'Connor's concerns about
per-capita programs. Whether most parents choose to use
voucher funds to send their children to religious schools rather
than other public schools or nonsectarian nonpublic schools,
seems to be irrelevant as Ion~ as the opportunity exists for par44
ents to make those decisions.
143. !d.
144. The Court does not seem influenced by the percentage of sectarian religiously
affiliated non public schools or percentage of students in them who are affected by government assistance, in comparison to nonsectarian non public schools. See Agostini, 521
U.S. at 251 (Souter, J., dissenting), upholding the on-site delivery of aid to students in
nonpublic schools even though all but 52 of the 22,000 students who received Title I aid
attended schools that were religiously affiliated. See also Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602 (Wis 1998), motion for reconsideration withdrawn, 588 N.W.2d 635 (Wis.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998) where even though the aid was available for
students in only nonpublic schools, the court reasoned that it was constitutional under
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As the Court and the Nation debate the future of public
education in light of various reform initiatives such as vouch145
ers,
and the reinvigorated Child Benefit test, educational
leaders and policy makers face an important question. This inquiry asks whether future deliberations on state aid will focus
on the broader question of where students can best be educated, thereby perhaps necessitating the adoption of Justice
Thomas's neutrality test, or the narrower question of worrying
about which forms of aid to students in religiously-affiliated
nonpublic schools are acceptable based on the fear of avoiding
endorsement or the ability to divert aid to religious purposes,
which might favor the adoption of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test. The way in which this question is resolved will certainly go a long way toward shaping the future of American K12 education. Yet, questions linger over the direction that the
Court might take as the future of several members is uncertain.
C. The Court's Future

As the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence continues to
evolve, or devolve, and given the delicate balance that exists
between and among its various factions, with one vote often
making the difference, perhaps the most significant factor that
will influence its direction will be the presidential election of
November 2000. Insofar as several Justices are likely to retire
over the next few years due to age and potential health problems, President George W. Bush will have the opportunity to
shape the Court's future well into the next century based on his
own philosophy. The change will be all the more interesting if
the retirements include Chief Justice Rehnquist. Keeping in
mind that, to date, there have only been sixteen Chief Justices
but more than forty different Presidents, it should be clear the
extent to which a presidential legacy can be shaped by judicial
appointments.
Even while acknowledging that there is no way of knowing
146
for certain how future Justices might rule, with Republican
the Establishment Clause and similar provisions in the state constitution because children attended these schools and were thus eligible to participate in the program based
on the private choices of their parents.
145. See supra, note 83.
146. As an example of how Supreme Court .Justices have minds of their own that
often surprise the Presidents who appoint them, the remarks of President Dwight D.
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G~orge W. Bush of Texas as President, he is expected to ap-

pomt strict constructionist Justices who may be open to accommodation. On the other hand, had Vice-President AI Gore,
the Democratic standard-bearer, won the election, he would
have been likely to name judicial activists and others who
would have interpreted the Constitution based on their own
ideological perspectives and would have been apt to favor sepa147
ration of Church and State.
One thing is for sure, that if
President Bush appoints the kind of Justices expected of him,
and avoids his father's pitfall of appointing the likes of liberal
Justice David Souter, and if these new Justices hold true to
form, then the Court will move in a different direction, both
with regard to prayer and state aid to students who attend religiously-affiliated nonpublic schools.
V. CONCLUSION

The place of religion in public education, in all of its manifestations, most notably as discussed in terms of prayer in
school and governmental aid to religiously affiliated nonpublic
schools, continues to occupy a central role in the Supreme
Court's evolving First Amendment jurisprudence. At this, the
dawn of the new Millennium, the Justices need to walk a fine
line between providing too much aid to religion and religious
institutions while avoiding hostility to religion. The way in
which the Court resolves these thorny issues will go a long way
in shaping both the quality of education that American children receive, regardless of where they attend classes and, just
as importantly, in determining what the face of the Nation will
look like.

Eisenhower come to mind. In light of the Warren Court's role in revolutionizing the
face of American constitutional law and society, "Eisenhower later called his appointment of [Earll Warren 'the biggest damn-fooled mistake' he had ever made." DAVID M.
O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 81 (1986).
147. The attitudes of Governor George W. Bush of Texas and Vice-President AI
Gore, the Democratic standard-bearer, were plainly evident in their first Presidential
debate. See, e.g., "... Mr. Bush did say that he wanted Supreme Court justices who
'look at the Constitution as sacred' and that he believed in 'strict constructionists."' Alison Mitchell, Bush and Gore Clash Over Tax Cuts in First Debate: Candidates Cite
Differences on Priorities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at AI, 16. See also Stuart Taylor Jr.,
The Supreme Question, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 30 (discussing how possible appointees of Gore or Bush might influence the direction of the Court).

